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THE COLUMBIAN EXCHANGE AND CONFLICT IN ASIA
MARK DINCECCO?, JAMES FENSKE†, AND ANIL MENON?
ABSTRACT. Difference in difference and event study analyses in a panel of Asian grid cells
over nine centuries demonstrate that greater agricultural potential due to New World
crops increased violent conflict after 1500. Rising caloric potential in a typical grid cell
increased conflict by roughly its mean. The result holds across several New World crops
and conflict types. It is largely driven by South Asia, a densely populated, diverse region
with several competing historical states. The evidence supports a rapacity effect – in-
creases in the gains from appropriation to Asian and non-Asian belligerents – as a mech-
anism. Population density, urbanization, and British imperialism significantly mediate
the impact of the Columbian Exchange.
1. INTRODUCTION
Did the introduction of New World crops after 1500 increase violent conflict in Asia?
Evidence of the effects of productivity on conflict typically consider transitory shocks
and short-run responses. Evidence on the impact of more long-lived changes in produc-
tivity are less common, with Iyigun, Nunn and Qian (2017a) as a notable exception. Over
time, many of the proximate causes of conflict, including patterns of settlement and the
configuration of states, may respond to permanent productivity increases. How, then,
does conflict behave in the long run in response to the introduction of productivity-
increasing crops? Further, Asian conflict may have facilitated European imperial expan-
sion and changed trade relations in the centuries after 1500. Understanding the sources
of Asian conflict thus helps to account for the Great Divergence in incomes between the
West and the rest of the world since the early modern period.
In this paper, we geocode all conflicts in Asia between 1000 and 1900 recorded in
Jaques (2007) and map these into a panel of 1◦×1◦ grid cells by century. We merge these
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crop yields both before and after 1500 on the basis of exogenous climatic and soil condi-
tions. We show in both difference in difference and event study specifications that grid
cells that gained in land productivity due to the Columbian Exchange saw increases in
conflict, including civil conflict. The magnitude of this effect is meaningful. An increase
in caloric suitability for a typical grid cell increased conflict incidence by roughly the
mean of the outcome variable (0.04 events per century).
We show these results are robust to several alternative estimation strategies. We adjust
standard errors for spatial correlation and use spatially correlated randomization infer-
ence. We report alternative estimators suited to the nature of our outcome variable – a
count variable with several zeroes and a long right tail. We control for differential time
trends across small groups of cells. We make restrictions of the sample based on crop
suitability, its change after 1500, and the presence of natural access to trade routes. We
allow for changes in how we define our units of observation both spatially and tempo-
rally. We include additional controls for geography, trade, settlement, and past conflict.
We can exclude or add conflicts based on the nature of participants, alternative data
sources, and the number of battles recorded for larger wars.
In understanding the mechanisms that explain this main result, we look at both het-
erogeneity and mediating variables. These suggest that a rapacity effect – a rise in the
gains from appropriation to belligerents – drives our results. Cells that increased in po-
tential productivity saw their value rise, and became more densely settled and urban.
This increased their attractiveness to both Asian and non-Asian political actors. Our
results are driven by several New World crops and several types of conflict. They are
largely driven by South Asia, a region that, in 1500, was comparatively densely settled,
diverse, and housed several competing states. We show that the effects are largest in
grid cells that have greater ethnic and genetic diversity in the present day. Mediation
analysis supports population density, urbanization, and, to a lesser extent, British im-
perialism as mechanisms. Like Iyigun, Nunn and Qian (2017a), we find that New World
crops reduce the impact of weather shocks on conflict, and so the changing response
of conflict to adverse weather shocks due to the Columbian Exchange cannot explain
our result. We do not find evidence that accumulated state history or greater inequality
across or between grid cells explain our result.
1.1. Contribution. We contribute principally to two literatures. The first considers the
economics of conflict, both in the present and historically. This is now a mature lit-
erature that has uncovered several causes of conflict, including resource price shocks
(Dube and Vargas, 2013), weather shocks (Harari and Ferrara, 2018; Iyigun, Nunn and
Qian, 2017b), historical state presence (Heldring, 2018), state capacity (Fearon and Laitin,
2003), the interaction of pathogens and weather shocks (Cervellati, Sunde and Valmori,
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2017), colonial partition (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016), and leader gender
(Dube and Harish, 2020). Other branches of this literature have focused instead on is-
sues such as the role of networks of combatant groups (König et al., 2017) or the role of
technology in army size (Onorato, Scheve and Stasavage, 2014).
Most closely related to our work are papers that demonstrate rapacity effects – con-
flicts motivated by the control of a contestable resource. Berman et al. (2017) show
that greater mineral prices increase conflict intensity near African mines. Higher food
prices in Africa, similarly, reduce conflict over territory in farming areas but increase
conflict over the division of surplus (McGuirk and Burke, 2017). Conflicts are partic-
ularly likely if resources are concentrated in the territory of a minority group (Morelli
and Rohner, 2015), and when they are near the border (Caselli, Morelli and Rohner,
2015). Rainfall shocks increase Maoist attacks on security forces in mining districts of
India (Vanden Eynde, 2018). Mass killings too are more prevalent where there are natu-
ral resource rents, ethnic polarization, and low labor productivity (Esteban, Morelli and
Rohner, 2015).
Our results contribute to this literature by further validating the role of natural re-
sources as a determinant of conflict in a historical sample that is broad in geographic
and temporal scope. The rising value of labor-intensive agricultural output can have
both opportunity cost effects, by increasing the actors’ cost of fighting relative to en-
gaging in productive economic activity, and the aforementioned rapacity effects, by in-
creasing the actors’ incentives to control the contestable resource. Past work has found
that the opportunity cost effect predominates (Berman and Couttenier, 2015; Collier
and Hoeffler, 2004; Dal Bó and Dal Bó, 2011; Dube and Vargas, 2013). Our results con-
trast with these findings. The long-run nature of our results, in which population and
urbanization have time to respond endogenously to the rise in caloric potential, is likely
to be an important source for this difference in findings.
The paper closest to ours is Iyigun, Nunn and Qian (2017a), who show that the in-
troduction of the white potato reduced violence in Europe, in part because it mitigated
the impact of adverse weather shocks on conflict. Our analysis complements theirs in
several ways. We examine a broader range of crops using improved suitability data and
novel conflict data in a context covering more than half the world’s population. Our
findings point to an increase in conflict, highlighting the fact that the impact of agricul-
tural productivity shocks – even those that are long lived – depends on the context in
which they are experienced.
Second, we contribute to a literature in economics on the Columbian Exchange itself
(Crosby, 1972; Nunn and Qian, 2010). Past empirical studies in economics have shown
that sweet potatoes mitigated the effect of adverse weather shocks on peasant revolts
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in China (Jia, 2014), and that maize increased population growth in China and Africa
(Chen and Kung, 2016; Cherniwchan and Moreno-Cruz, 2019). Both Mokyr (1981) and
Nunn and Qian (2011) have demonstrated population impacts of the white potato. We
examine the direct effects across several New World crops and several conflict types in
a broader geographic context and test for heterogeneity in these effects across regions
of Asia. Contrary to Jia (2014), we find that the increase in agricultural potential raised
conflict incidence. This difference may stem in part from the long-run nature of our
analysis, in which population and urbanization can adjust to changes in agricultural
productivity.
In Section 2 we explain our identification strategy. In Section 3 we present our data
sources and outline the relevant historical background. In Section 4 we outline our re-
sults and the robustness exercises that we include in the appendix. In Section 5 we pro-
vide our heterogeneity and mediation analysis on mechanisms. Section 6 concludes.
2. IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
2.1. Identification: Difference in Difference. Our dataset will consist of a set of more
than 3,500 1◦ × 1◦ grid cells in Asia, as defined by the United Nations, observed each
century. Our sample will start with the century that begins in 1000CE and end with the
century that starts in 1800CE. In order to assess the impact of the increase in agricultural
potential due to the Columbian Exchange on the prevalence of conflict, we will use both
difference in difference and event study approaches. Our difference in difference spec-
ification is as follows:
ConflictStartsit = βCSIit + (x
′
i × Postt)γ + δi + ηt + εit(1)
Here,ConflictStartsit is the number of conflict starts observed in grid cell i in century
t. In alternative specifications, we will replace ConflictStartsit with other measures of
conflict, such as the number of civil conflicts. CSIit is the Galor and Özak (2015) caloric
suitability index. Prior to 1500, it is based on Old World crops only. Following European
contact with the Americas from 1500 onward, it includes New World crops. Our fixed
effects framework will remove the need to control for time-invariant confounding vari-
ables. However, because time trends arising from changes in CSIit may correlate with
time trends arising from time-invariant characteristics of grid cells, we include x′i×Postt
in Equation (1). That is, we control for time-invariant variables interacted with a dummy
for the period from 1500 onwards in order to account for these trends.1 In our baseline,
xi includes only pre-1500 CSI. For robustness we add a wide set of other controls for
1In this specification, we interact these variables with a Postt dummy for symmetry with theCSIit, which
only takes one value before 1500 and one value after 1500. Interacting our controls Xi with century fixed
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geography, trade, settlement, and past conflict. δi and ηt are grid cell and century fixed
effects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by grid cell in the baseline. For ro-
bustness, we will report alternative standard errors clustered at broader geographical
units and that account for both spatial and serial correlation in the error term, εit.







iγt + δi + ηt + εit(2)
Here, ConflictStartsit, xi, δi, and ηt are defined as in Equation (1). What has changed
is that our principal right hand side variable becomes ∆CSIi, which is the increase in
the Galor and Özak (2015) caloric suitability index for cell i after 1500. That is, it is a mea-
sure of the extent to which the cell has been “treated” by the Columbian Exchange. We
estimate a sequence of time-varying coefficients on this treatment measure,
∑
t βt. Fol-
lowing standard conventions, the omitted century is the one beginning in 1400, i.e. the
final “pre-treatment” time period. Coefficient estimates of βt for prior centuries should
be close to zero – this would be evidence in favor of the parallel trends assumption. Our
control variables, xi, are now interacted with century fixed effects. As before, we cluster
standard errors by grid cell in the baseline.
3. DATA AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
3.1. Conflict.
3.1.1. Data. Data on conflict come from Jaques (2007). Used previously in several stud-
ies, including Moscona, Nunn and Robinson (2018) and Gennaioli and Voth (2015), this
is a dictionary of more than 8,000 battles spanning the entire globe. Each entry in the
dictionary is a brief description of a battle, where and when it occurred, the participants,
and the outcome. For example, one entry is as follows:
Peshawar | 1001 |Muslim Conquest of Northern India
On campaign from Afghanistan into India, Mahmud of Ghazni attacked
the powerful Raja Jaipal of Punjab, previously defeated at Lamghan (989).
Outside Peshawar, the Raja and a coalition of Hindu Princes were heavily
defeated and Jaipal committed suicide in captivity. Jaipal’s son Anandpal
was similarly defeated near Peshawar at Waihand in 1006 and 1008 (27
November 1001).
effects, as we do when estimating the event study given in Equation (2), has little effect on our estimate
of β (not reported).
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Beginning in 1000CE, we geo-locate all events in this source that occurred in Asia
according to the coordinates of the settlement closest to the conflict location listed. This
approach allows us to bypass the difficulty of identifying the start and end dates of larger
wars, which typically spanned multiple battlefield locations and years. We also code the
conflict type (e.g. land battle, siege), date, duration, participants, and the coordinates
of the participants’ capitals. Conflict types are based on descriptions in Jaques (2007). A
battle is coded as a civil conflict in two cases:
(1) Immediately prior to this battle, one of the actors was a subject of one of the
opposing actors.
(2) If a renegade fights an overlord without substantial external support, that is, no
external actors are named as supporting the renegade.
As a result, we have a sample of 1,278 recorded battles in Asia between 1000CE and
1900CE. Land battles fought in the open account for 53 percent of all sample battles,
while sieges of strategic outposts (e.g. urban centers) account for another 33 percent.
Stormings of strategic outposts account for an additional 20 percent, and the sacking or
razing of them an additional 4 percent.2 Naval battles account for just 7 percent of sam-
ple battles. 70 percent of sample battles were interstate conflicts, whereas 30 percent
were civil conflicts. 54 percent of sample battles lasted only one day, while another 45
percent lasted multiple days.
For a conflict to be included in Jaques (2007), it must have been written down, cross-
referenced with at least two independent sources, and have a consensus among the
sources on the main details. As a check on data quality, we construct alternative con-
flict data that we use in robustness exercises by adding non-overlapping conflicts from
a number of sources that differ across Asian sub-regions. For South Asia including In-
dia, these come from Clodfelter (2002) and Naravane (1997). For imperial China, these
come from the Nanjing Military Academy (2003), as put together by Dincecco and Wang
(2018). For the Ottoman Empire, we add events from Bradbury (2004) and Clodfelter
(2002).3 Further robustness checks consider several additional changes to the set of
2For purposes of precision, we code battles as either sieges or stormings, sackings, or razings, depending
on the specific terminology that Jaques (2007) employs in each entry.
3In our view, Jaques (2007) is the best source from which to construct the main conflict database for our
study. First, unlike Brecke (1999), which starts in 1400CE, or Clodfelter (2002), which starts just prior to
1500CE, the use of Jaques (2007) enables us to start our analysis much farther back in time. Second, the
units of observation in Brecke (1999) are wars (i.e. a group of battles which typically span multiple lo-
cations and years), whereas the units of observations in Jaques (2007) are battles, which not only makes
geo-locating straightforward, but allows us to bypass the difficulty of identifying the start and end dates
of larger wars. The conflict details provided by Brecke (1999), moreover, are somewhat vague. For exam-
ple, one entry simply reads “China (minority in Hebei, Shandong, Anhui, Jiangsu), 1400-02”. Third, while
Jaques (2007) provides a standardized description for each battle (see the example above), the level of de-
tail provided by Clodfelter (2002) varies idiosyncratically across battles. As described above, in robustness
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FIGURE 1. Conflict starts before 1500
conflicts included in our database, such as discarding all conflicts involving non-Asian
participants, or excluding the largest wars. Grid cell and century fixed effects and time
trends help account for any remaining unobserved differences in data quality and cov-
erage across place and time.
In our baseline analysis, we count the number of conflict starts in a given grid cell in
a given century. To give an idea of the spatial dispersion of conflict in our data before
and after the Columbian Exchange, we use Figure 1 to show the prevalence of conflict
starts before 1500 across grid cells. Similarly, we use Figure 2 to show the prevalence of
conflict starts after 1500, and Figure 3 to show the change in the prevalence of conflict
between these two broader periods.
Before 1500, there are a number of visible clusters of conflict, including in Anatolia,
the Levant, western Central Asia, along the Yangtze River, in the Hong River Delta, and
on the islands of Honshu and Shikoku. After 1500, several of these remain active in
conflict, but new clusters have emerged, including in the Caucasus, in much of South
Asia, in Southern China, in Manchuria, and in the Korean Peninsula.
3.1.2. Historical Background. The set of conflicts and actors in our data reflects the
changing nature of conflict in Asia over the past millennium. In the first two centuries
of the data, events such as the first three Holy Land Crusades, the Muslim conquest of
Northern India, the Seljuk Wars of Expansion, and the Genpei War contribute many
of the battles seen. Actors who appear frequently include Mahmud of Ghazni, Mi-
namoto Yoshinaka, and key figures in the Crusades, including Bohemund of Taranto,
Raymond of Toulouse, Saladin, and Nur-ed-Din. The Crusades were a set of military
checks we still employ alternative conflict data from Clodfelter (2002) and other sources to supplement
those from Jaques (2007).
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FIGURE 2. Conflict starts after 1500
FIGURE 3. Change in conflict starts before and after 1500
campaigns from the eleventh through thirteenth centuries supported by the Roman
Catholic Church with the aim of recapturing land between the Jordan River and the
Mediterranean that had fallen to Islamic rule (Lock, 2013). Jaques (2007) reports sev-
eral major events in these campaigns, including the 1098 siege of Orontes and the 1101
relief of Ramleh. Conquests of India by Muslim dynasties such as the Ghaznavids and
Ghurids gave rise to the Delhi Sultanate in 1206 (Jackson, 2003). Jaques (2007) notes
many events in this process, including Mahmud of Ghazni’s attack on Bhera in 1006 and
Muhammad of Ghor’s rout of Chandwar in 1194. After its foundation in 1037, the Seljuk
Empire expanded to encompass much of the area between Anatolia and the Hindu Kush
(Peacock, 2015). Battles in the Seljuk expansion recorded in Jaques (2007) include the
1051 siege of Tarq and Beg’s conquest of Baghdad in 1055. In Japan, the Genpei civil
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conflict between the Minamoto and Taira clans paved the way for the creation of the
Kamakura bakufu and the beginning of feudal government (Walker, 2015).
From the 1200s onwards, conflicts relating to the Mongols and their successors begin
to fill the data, including the conquests of Genghis Khan, the Mongol Wars of Kubilai
Khan, and the Conquests of Tamerlane. The rise of the Ming Dynasty, its imperial wars,
and its wars in northern Vietnam also feature prominently. In South Asia, the Wars of the
Delhi Sultanate and the Vijayanagar-Bahmani Wars contribute several conflict events.
Many of the important actors of this period follow from this, including Genghis Khan,
Tamerlane, and the Hongwu Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang.
Pre-industrial warfare in Asia differed from that in Europe: it was more violent, more
likely to result in the collapse of empires, and featured the asymmetric involvement of
Steppe nomads who raided agricultural peoples in times of distress and could retreat
indefinitely when defeated (Ko, Koyama and Sng, 2018). After Temujin unified several
Mongol Steppe nomads and took the title of Genghis Khan in 1206, the Mongol Empire
spread to become the largest land empire in history. This had fractured by 1294 into
the Golden Horde, Chagatai Khanate, Ilkhanate, and the Yuan Dynasty in China (May,
2007). Zhu Yuanzhang’s forces conquered the Yuan in 1368, and he became the first
emperor of the Ming dynasty that would last until 1644 (Mote, 1988). The Ming fought
several imperial wars against the Mongols in the 1400s and that appear in Jaques (2007).
Tamerlane saw himself as an heir of Genghis Khan and established the Timurid Empire,
which by his death in 1405 controlled the former lands of the Golden Horde, Chagatai
Khanate, and Ilkhanate (Manz, 1999).
The Delhi Sultanate was the dominant power in India from its foundation in 1206
until its conquest by Babur in 1526 gave rise to the Mughal Empire (Jackson, 2003). It
fought a number of battles against other states in the region, including Deogiri and the
Kingdom of Kakatiya (Jaques, 2007). The Vijayanagara Empire, based in India’s Deccan
Plateau, was a major power in the south of present-day India, and began to decline after
its loss to the Deccan sultanates at the Battle of Talikota in 1565 (Sinopoli, 2000).
Between 1500 and 1700, many of the events in our data remain between Asian parties:
the Japanese Era of the Warring States, the Japanese invasion of Korea, the Mughal Con-
quest of Northern India, Mughal conflicts with the Marathas, and the Manchu conquest
of China all feature heavily. Mughal Emperors such as Babur, Akbar, and Humayun be-
come frequent conflict actors, as do Japanese daimyo like Toyotomi Hideyoshi. With
the weakening of the central authority of the Ashikaga bakufu, Japan descended from
1467 to 1582 into a period of conflict between local domain lords, or daimyo, which
ended with Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s completion of the military unification begun under
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Oda Nobunaga. Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea in 1592 ultimately failed and his succes-
sor, Tokugawa Ieyasu, founded the Tokugawa Shogunate (Walker, 2015). The Mughal
empire expanded to cover most of the Indian subcontinent by the death of Emperor Au-
rangzeb in 1707, before beginning a period of decline (Dalrymple, 2019). Events from
the Mughal conquests in our data include the victories against Sultan Nasrat Ali at Gogra
in 1529 and against the Deccan Sultanates in Bijapur in 1685-86 (Jaques, 2007). The
Maratha Confederacy began with the coronation of Shivaji in 1674 and displaced the
Mughals from much of modern India (Dalrymple, 2019). Events involving Mughal con-
flict with the Marathas in our data include a 1729 battle near Jaitpur and the Mughal
capture of Kalyan in 1682 (Jaques, 2007). The Manchu conquest of China between 1618
and 1683 saw the Qing Empire replace the Ming and the unification of several regions
outside China proper (Peterson, 2016). Jaques (2007) records many major events in this
process, including the Ming repulsion of an attack on Ningyuan in 1626 and the failed
attempt of the Ming to recapture Nanjing in 1659.
It is only after 1700 that conflicts involving Europeans begin to contribute a large
number of events outside of the Middle East, including the Seven Years’ War, the Car-
natic Wars, the Indian Mutiny, and the First British Afghan War. Names of actors such
as Akbar Khan, Tantia Topi, and General Sir Hugh Rose rise to prominence. Three Car-
natic Wars in India between 1746 and 1763 were fought between the French East India
Company, the British East India Company, and their Indian allies. Indeed, the Third
Carnatic War (1756-1763) was an outgrowth of the Seven Years’ War (Dalrymple, 2019).
Jaques (2007) reports several battles in these conflicts, including the French taking of
the British fort at Madras in 1746 and the ambush of Robert Clive by Raza Sahib at
Kveripak in 1752. The Indian Rebellion of 1857 began in Meerut as a mutiny by Indian
infantrymen in the British East India Company, but soon expanded into a widespread
rebellion based on diverse grievances including resistance to social changes and land
taxes (David, 2003). Here, coverage in Jaques (2007) is particularly thorough, including
Colin Campbell’s capture of Sikander Bagh and the rout of Tantia Topi at Sikar. The First
British Afghan War took place between 1839 and 1942, when the British East India Com-
pany was defeated following its intervention in a succession dispute in Afghanistan.
Battles like those at Ali Masjid and Tenzin in 1842 appear in Jaques (2007).
3.2. Caloric suitability.
3.2.1. Data. Our data on caloric suitability are taken from Galor and Özak (2015), and
have been previously used in Galor and Özak (2016) and Galor, Özak and Sarid (2016).
These data improve over past measures of land quality (e.g. Ramankutty et al., 2002) by
taking potential caloric output into account. These are constructed using raster data
from the FAO’s Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) project, which reports expected
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FIGURE 4. Caloric suitability before 1500
rain-fed, low-input crop yields based on soil quality and climate. Galor and Özak (2015)
convert these from tons per hectare per year to thousands of calories per hectare per
year based on caloric data from the United States Department of Agriculture. Through-
out, we will work with units of one million calories per hectare per year. Taking 2,500
calories per day as a guide, this would be roughly equivalent to the output needed to
support an additional adult male.
These are reported separately for the crops available before and after 1500. They re-
port caloric suitability separately for the crops available in a given grid cell prior to 1500
and after, based on the exchange of crops after European contact with the Americas.
These are reported as raster data on a 5′×5′ grid (approximately 6 miles by 6 miles at the
equator). We average over raster points within a 1◦ × 1◦ grid cell in order to compute a
caloric suitability measure for that grid cell. This index varies over time for cells within
our data primarily due to the introduction of New World Crops. Those New World crops
for which Galor and Özak (2015) have made crop-specific suitability data available are:
beans, cassava, coconuts, groundnuts, maize, sunflower, sweet potatoes, tomatoes, and
white potatoes.
To give an idea of the spatial dispersion of caloric suitability in our data before and
after the Columbian Exchange, we use Figure 4 to show average caloric suitability before
1500 for each grid cell. We then use Figure 5 to show average caloric suitability after
1500, and Figure 6 to show the change caloric suitability as a result of the Columbian
Exchange.
Before 1500, the most fertile regions of Asia are concentrated in southern China, Japan,
and southeast Asia. After 1500, gains in caloric suitability are concentrated in Northern
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FIGURE 5. Caloric suitability after 1500
FIGURE 6. The Columbian Exchange: Change in caloric suitability
and Western China, the Korean peninsula, Japan, and much of South Asia. Particu-
larly in the Korean peninsula, South Asia, and southern Japan, there is a clear overlap
between cells that gained from the Columbian Exchange, and those that saw conflict
increase after 1500.
To provide a sense of which New World crops contributed the most to gains in agricul-
tural productivity, we computed the increase in caloric suitability in each cell, calculated
as the difference (if positive) between caloric suitability for each new crop minus caloric
suitability prior to 1500. Many cells experienced mean gains due to the introduction of
New World crops, with maize by far the most important to rising agricultural productiv-
ity, followed by sunflower, groundnuts, coconuts, cassava, beans, and sweet potatoes in
that order.
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3.2.2. Historical Background. The New World crops that became available in Asia after
the Columbian Exchange were primarily tubers – cassava, white potatoes, and sweet
potatoes. Maize was the primary cereal that Asia gained from the New World, whereas
several major cereals were already present (Mayshar et al., 2015). Many of these new
crops had different soil and weather requirements than Old World crops, and so could
complement them by being grown in other seasons or on land that would otherwise be
unproductive (Crosby, 1972). Many foods that did not become major sources of calories
in Asia were, however, important because of their other nutritional benefits. Capsicum
peppers have become important in the cuisines of South and South East Asia, as well as
southwestern China; these provide vitamins A, B, and C, magnesium, and iron. Toma-
toes, similarly, are rich in vitamins A and C (Nunn and Qian, 2010). Chili peppers also
aid in food preservation (Walton, 2018).
New World crops arrived early in the Middle East. Maize was available by the 1500s,
and words for maize elsewhere in Asia reflect their perceived origin in an Islamic region
(Crosby, 1972). The Philippines were a major source of diffusion of New World crops
to the rest of Asia, after the Spanish introduction of “Castilian seeds.” Cassava reached
the Philippines by the 1600s (Mazumdar, 1999). Several New World food items made
it into the Japanese diet during the sixteenth century, including sweet potatoes, white
potatoes, and red peppers (Bestor and Bestor, 2011). In Indonesia, sweet potatoes may
have arrived before Europeans, and maize was a staple before 1700. By 1800, it was the
most important secondary crop in Java. Cassava produces nearly twice as many calories
per hectare as rice on Java, and survives on more marginal land. It is also an important
staple in Sumatra today (Boomgaard, 2003; Crosby, 1972; Dixon, 1982).
It was the Spanish and Portuguese who brought New World crops to China, largely
through Guangdong and Fujian. The overland route from northeastern India to Bengal
and Assam was also a source of new varieties (Mazumdar, 1999). In land-scarce China,
the adoption of New World crops was comparatively rapid (Earle, 2012). 55% of the
country’s land was suitable for maize and 20% for sweet potatoes. For the first 200 years
after its introduction in 1580, maize spread slowly from the three initial places it was
introduced – Gansu, Yunnan, and Fujian. After 1750, it spread more rapidly into regions
suitable for its cultivation, including the lower Yangtze, the North China plain, and the
valleys of Sichuan (Chen and Kung, 2016).
Sweet potatoes and groundnuts were the basis of an agricultural revolution in China
at the end of the 1500s (Mazumdar, 1999). Chinese businessmen working in Southeast
Asia brought sweet potatoes back with them; government promotion only became im-
portant from the middle of the 1700s (Jia, 2014). Sweet potatoes arrived via Guangdong
and Fujian, and became a substitute for rice (Mazumdar, 1999). Southern provinces
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adopted them by the middle of the late 1600s, and northern provinces by the middle of
the 1700s.
Maize became a staple of China’s inland highlands, and was prevalent in Sichuan
and Hubei before 1700. Sweet potatoes grew in marginal soil, resisted drought, with-
stood pests, and demanded little labor (Mazumdar, 1999). They allowed new land to
be brought under cultivation (Earle, 2012). These combined productivity and insurance
effects of sweet potatoes fueled population growth, and mitigated the impact of drought
on peasant revolts (Jia, 2014). The adoption of sweet potatoes and maize was driven by
peasants, rather than elites, due to their high caloric content and lower labor require-
ments (Earle, 2012). Groundnuts were introduced as early as 1538 (Mazumdar, 1999).
In India, the Portuguese and Dutch introduced most New World crops in the regions
around Goa, Surat, Cochin, and Bengal (Mazumdar, 1999). The diffusion of New World
crops was slower in India than in China, possibly due to lower pressure on agricultural
land; their adoption increased under colonial pressure (Earle, 2012) and was particu-
larly notable in the nineteenth century (Mazumdar, 1999). New World crops are noted
in several sources earlier: pineapples were regularly served to the Mughal emperor Ak-
bar, and guavas were also noted by accounts from the 1600s (Crosby, 1972; Mazumdar,
1999). Sweet potatoes are noted as early as 1615 and were common in the south by the
1670s. Potatoes were actively encouraged by the colonial government in the nineteenth
century, and became (with the tomato) an urban staple (Mazumdar, 1999). They were
cultivated in mountains and as a winter crop, and eaten especially on fast days when
Hindus are not permitted to eat grain (Crosby, 1972).
Cassava was not widespread in India until the 1850s (Crosby, 1972), and was pro-
moted by the local ruler in Kerala in the 1880s (Mazumdar, 1999). It became a staple in
Assam, Travancore, and Cochin (Crosby, 1972). It was maize that had the greatest im-
pact on Indian agriculture (Mazumdar, 1999). It was assessed for taxes in Rajasthan by
1664, and became a staple of the poorer highlands of the Himalayas and the poor in the
Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar (Crosby, 1972; Mazumdar, 1999). There was also maize
cultivation in seventeenth-century Maharashtra (Habib, 1980). Maize and groundnuts
both became casual foods of urban areas (Mazumdar, 1999). The Columbian Exchange
brought chili peppers to Thailand and India (Earle, 2012). The spread of American foods
in India from the late 1700s coincides with the subcontinent’s rapid uptick in population
growth (Crosby, 1972).
Beyond new crops, the Columbian Exchange may have introduced other phenom-
ena into Asia. Our analysis will account for time-varying unobservable features of the
Columbian Exchange (e.g. new ideas) through local time trends, interaction effects,
and a variety of robustness checks. Unlike indigenous populations in the Americas,
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Asian populations were typically immune to the same diseases (e.g. measles, small-
pox) as were Europeans (Diamond, 2005). Gunpowder and firearms were invented in
ninth-century China, and spread across Eurasia (Hoffman, 2015). Piercing and cutting
weapons were also commonplace. Hoffman (2015) argues that enduring differences
in geopolitical contexts across Eurasia help explain why military technology advanced
most rapidly in early modern Europe. For the above reasons, we do not expect either
the introduction of new diseases or greater access to new military technology due to the
Columbian Exchange to confound our analysis.4
3.3. Data: Other Variables. We use a variety of additional controls and candidate me-
diator variables in our analysis. As possible geographic confounders, we compute lati-
tude, longitude, and distance from the coast for each cell ourselves using ArcMAP. Sev-
eral variables are available as raster data, and we average these over points within a
1◦ × 1◦ grid cell. These include terrain ruggedness from Nunn and Puga (2012), popula-
tion density from Klein Goldewijk et al. (2011), and altitude from the FAO-GAEZ project.
We control for presence of a river recorded in the Natural Earth project.5 We use the pop-
ulations of cities estimated by Chandler (1987) and Modelski (2003), which have been
compiled and geo-coded by Reba, Reitsma and Seto (2016).6 We will also make use of
gridded temperature reconstruction data from Mann et al. (2009). We introduce addi-
tional controls and candidate mediators below when they are used for the first time.
3.4. Summary Statistics. We present summary statistics in Table 1. The mean of our
outcome variable is 0.039, implying that a typical cell in our data experiences a conflict
once every 25 centuries. The distribution of conflict events is, however, skewed, with
some cells experiencing as many as 16 events in a century. Civil conflicts, being a subset
of all conflict events, are more rare.
The mean cell in our data has a caloric suitability index of 4.81 million calories per
hectare, though this mean also masks considerable heterogeneity. For the most produc-
tive cells in the sample, this is as high as 17.1 million, while other cells are completely
unsuitable for agriculture.
4Over time, improvements in military technology made financial resources more important to battlefield
success (Gennaioli and Voth, 2015). Our analysis will account for the rising costs of warfare through cen-
tury fixed effects as well as local time trends and interaction effects.
5http://www.naturalearthdata.com/
6These data form an unbalanced panel of city sizes. For our analyses, we interpolate city populations
geometrically between reported years. In years prior to the first reported city size, we assume a city grew
geometrically in size from a population of 1 in 2250 BCE. We also assume a city ceased growing after the
final reported city size. These imputations will be relevant to the mediation analysis presented in Table 9,
the results of which are robust to making the alternative assumption that cities start at a population of 0,
and only change stepwise each time a new city size is reported.
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4. RESULTS
4.1. Main Results. We present our main estimates of Equation (1) with grid cell and
century fixed effects in Table 2. In Table 3, we add the geographic controls for lati-
tude, longitude, ruggedness, altitude, distance from the coast, and rivers. In both ta-
bles, columns (1) and (2) consider all conflict starts as the dependent variable, while
columns (3) and (4) consider civil conflict starts. Columns (2) and (4) add the interac-
tion of pre-1500 caloric suitability with a post-1500 dummy, in order to account for any
potential trend differences that may correlate with initial land quality. Coefficients are
not sensitive to geographic controls interacted with the post-1500 indicator.
In both tables and across specifications, we find that increases in potential land pro-
ductivity due to the Columbian Exchange increased the number of conflicts, including
civil conflicts. The magnitude of these results is sizable: a one unit (i.e. one million
calories per hectare per year) increase in caloric suitability raised conflict in a given
grid cell by 0.041 events per century. The mean gain in caloric suitability from the
Columbian Exchange in our sample was 1.11 units. So: the mean Columbian Exchange
treatment raised conflict incidence by 0.041 × 1.11 = 0.046 events in a century, which
is slightly larger than its mean. As an alternative approach to considering magnitudes,
a one standard deviation increase in caloric suitability (4.12) raised conflict in a cell by
0.041 × 4.12 = 0.167 events in a century, compared with a standard deviation of 0.36.
Roughly half of this increase comes from civil conflict.
The coefficient on the interaction of pre-1500 caloric suitability with a post-1500 dummy
is insignificant in several specifications, much smaller than the coefficient on time-
varying caloric suitability, and negative. This on its own serves as a sort of placebo that
validates the parallel trends assumption. As further evidence, we present our estimates
of Equation (2) as event-study graphs in Figures 7 and 8. These correspond to specifi-
cations in which pre-1500 caloric suitability has been included as a control, interacted
with the century fixed effects. Both figures show a similar pattern: coefficients on the
interaction of the change in caloric suitability with century dummies are close to zero
before the century beginning in 1400 (i.e. the final “pre-treatment” time period, which
we omit), validating the parallel trends assumption. From 1500, conflict becomes more
prevalent in cells that benefitted more from the Columbian Exchange. This increase is
gradual, but growing over time. This is consistent with the slow diffusion of New World
crops throughout Asia. Our results should be taken as intent-to-treat estimates, not of
the impact of the cultivation of New World crops per se but of the capacity to cultivate
them.
In Table 4, we replace the caloric suitability index with a measure of the suitability for
a given New World crop, interacted with post. We consider all New World food crops
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FIGURE 7. Event study results: Conflict starts
FIGURE 8. Event study results: Civil conflict starts
that Galor and Özak (2015) have made available: beans, cassava, coconuts, groundnuts,
maize, sunflower, sweet potatoes, tomatoes, and white potatoes. We find that our results
are driven by a wide set of crops. The key exceptions are white potatoes and coconuts.
As in Iyigun, Nunn and Qian (2017a), white potatoes have a conflict-dampening effect
in some specifications.
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4.2. Robustness. In this section, we outline a number of robustness exercises that we
report in the appendix.
We take three alternative approaches to standard errors. The first is Conley (1999)
standard errors that account for spatial correlation up to cutoffs of, in alternative spec-
ifications, 500, 1000, 1500, and 2000km. These also permit serial correlation up to ten
lags.7 Our results, in Table A1, remain significant at the 5 percent level across cutoffs.
The second is spatially unconstrained randomization inference. We randomly reallo-
cate the caloric suitability indices across grid cells in our data and re-estimate Equation
(1). We do this 999 times, and plot the distribution of coefficient estimates in Figure
A1. These are narrowly concentrated around zero. We do not plot our baseline results
in these figures because they lie far outside the distribution of coefficients generated in
this placebo exercise. Our baseline coefficient estimates are nearly four times as large
as the largest estimate that we obtain when instead using randomly reallocated caloric
suitability. It is unlikely, then, that estimates of the same magnitude as ours could be
generated by chance.
Because this procedure may not be sufficiently conservative given the spatial cor-
relation in variables such as conflict and caloric suitability (Kelly, 2019), our third ap-
proach is an alterative in which we only reallocate caloric suitability across cells with
centroids within 500km. We again do this 999 times, and plot the distribution of coef-
ficient estimates in Figure A2. Now, the coefficient estimates are often larger than zero,
albeit smaller than our baseline estimates. This is unsurprising, as the placebo values
of caloric suitability assigned to each cell will be correlated with the true values. How-
ever, it is still clear that the estimates produced are much smaller than our baseline
estimates, which are now indicated with vertical lines. In all four cases, corresponding
to the columns of Table 2, our baseline estimates are larger than the maximum of the
coefficients obtained through randomization inference. Even noise that is highly corre-
lated with the true treatment variable is unlikely to produce a treatment effect similar to
the one we estimate.
We consider several alternative approaches to estimation. Because our outcome vari-
able is a count variable with a large number of zeroes, we begin by estimating a Poisson
estimator with high-dimensional fixed effects (Guimaraes and Portugal, 2010). The re-
sults, in Table A2, remain positive and significant. Alternatively, because there are some
observations with many more conflict events than the mean, we transform our depen-
dent variables using ln(1 + x) in Table A3, and the results remain robust.8 Including a
lagged dependent variable, in Table A4, does little to our coefficient estimates.
7We use Thiemo Fetzer’s implementation based on Hsiang (2010).
8Recoding our outcome variables as dummies for the presence of any conflict start or civil conflict start in
a cell in a given century also gives results that are positive and significant, though we do not report these.
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Because of the computational infeasibility of including more than 3,500 cell-specific
time trends as controls, we instead control for trends for broader cells: 5◦ × 5◦, 4◦ ×
4◦, 3◦ × 3◦, and 2◦ × 2◦. We report these results in Table A5. Although these reduce
our coefficient estimates, the results for conflict starts remain positive and significant
across all cell sizes, while those for civil conflicts remain positive and significant with
linear trends for 5◦ × 5◦ cells. Given the gradual response to treatment that is evident in
Figures 7 and 8, we do not believe these trends are appropriate controls in our baseline,
but we do believe this is evidence that the results we find are not simply artifacts of
differential trends across cells that would have existed in the absence of the Columbian
Exchange. Alternatively, we control for (anachronistic) country × century fixed effects
in Table A6. Although smaller than in the baseline, the coefficient estimates remain
positive and significant.
We consider several alternative sample restrictions. We use two approaches to show
that our results are not driven by the inclusion of low-potential cells in the data. In
Table A7, we show that results hold restricting to a sample of cells that experienced a
positive change in caloric suitability as a result of the Columbian Exchange. In Table
A8, we discard cells that are in the bottom quintile, bottom two quintiles, and bottom
three quintiles of pre-1500 caloric suitability. The results remain positive and significant
across these sample restrictions. Although our data span all of Asia, it is not the case
that our results are driven by comparing a broad set of agriculturally poor cells to a
small subset that are either high-productivity or that made exceptional gains due to the
Columbian Exchange.
To rule out the possibility that our results are confounded by correlations between
the gains due to the Columbian Exchange and gains from trade after 1500, in Table A9
we discard all cells that are coastal or intersected by a river. Results remain robust and
are not, therefore, driven by a coincidental increase in caloric suitability in the locations
that may have seen the greatest increase in trade due to other natural features after 1500.
We also consider several alternative units of observation. In Table A10, we show that
our results continue to hold when data are aggregated to 2◦×2◦, 3◦×3◦, 4◦×4◦, and even
5◦ × 5◦ grid cells. In Table A11, we show that our results remain positive and significant
in all but one specification if the time window used to define a period is narrowed to 50
years or widened to 250.
We include several additional controls not in our baseline analysis. In Table A12, we
control for conflicts prior to 1500, interacted with a dummy for 1500 and later. In Ta-
ble A13, we control for distance from the closest city reported in Reba, Reitsma and
Seto (2016), interacted with a dummy for 1500 and later. In Table A14, we control for
whether a cell is intersected by one of the trade routes existing in 1500 mapped by
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Kennedy (2002), interacted with a dummy for 1500 and later. In Table A15 we interact
the Beck and Sieber (2010) index of suitability for nomadic pastoralism with the “post”
dummy. Our results remain similar to the baseline across these specifications, and so
it is unlikely that our results are driven by spurious correlations between the post-1500
increase in caloric suitability and past legacies of conflict, prior urbanization, declining
overland trade including the Silk Roads, or changes in the role of the pastoralist groups
such as the Mongols that featured prominently in warfare before 1500.
We make several changes to the set of conflicts included in our database. In Table
A16, we discard all conflicts involving at least one non-Asian participant. Results con-
tinue to be positive and significant, and so our results are not driven exclusively by Eu-
ropean imperialism, even if it may be one important mechanism. Adding additional
conflicts for South Asia from Clodfelter (2002) and Naravane (1997) (Table A17), for
China from Dincecco and Wang (2018) (Table A18), or for Turkey from Clodfelter (2002)
and Bradbury (2004) (Table A19) do not change the results appreciably. Because some
broader wars involve a large number of battles (such as the Crusader-Muslim Wars or
the Mughal-Maratha Wars), we show in Table A20 that excluding the largest (by num-
ber of events), 3 largest, 5 largest, and even 10 largest wars from the data does not lead
the link between the Columbian Exchange and conflict to become statistically insignif-
icant. Our results are not, then, driven by a small number of outliers. Similarly, as an
alternative check whether imperialism drives our results, we exclude conflicts between
participants whose capitals are more than 500, 1000, 1500, and 2000 km apart in Table
A21. Again, the results remain robust. A list of the wars in our data and the number of
battles recorded for each is in Table A22.
5. MECHANISMS
5.1. Conceptual Framework. We base our consideration of possible mechanisms on
prior literature in economics. Many studies focus on the dichotomy between oppor-
tunity cost and rapacity effects highlighted by Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2011). Adapted to
our context, the relationship between an increase in agricultural productivity due to the
Columbian Exchange and conflict can in theory go either way. On one hand, greater
agricultural productivity can have opportunity cost effects, by raising the actors’ cost of
fighting relative to engaging in (now more productive) economic activity. On the other
hand, greater agricultural productivity can have rapacity effects, by increasing the ac-
tors’ incentives to control the (now more valuable) contestable resource. That we find
an increase in conflict in response to an increase in agricultural productivity after 1500
suggests that the opportunity cost effect is unlikely to operate in our data, since this
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effect would have reduced the incentive for engaging in violence rather than in produc-
tive economic activity. It thus makes sense to focus on rapacity as a broad category of
mechanisms.
Rapacity is an incentive often cited in explanations of present-day conflict (Berman
et al., 2017; McGuirk and Burke, 2017). As cells become more productive, this might in-
crease population, urbanization, and the value of land. Nunn and Qian (2011), Chen
and Kung (2016), and Cherniwchan and Moreno-Cruz (2019) have all demonstrated
population effects of New World crops in other data. Crosby (1972) himself linked pop-
ulation in the Old World after 1500 to the greater caloric content of New World crops;
potatoes, for example, produced 7.5 million calories per hectare, versus 4.2 for wheat
(Earle, 2012). This would make cells more valuable prizes for both Asian and non-Asian
belligerents which, following a logic similar to Dube and Vargas (2013), could increase
conflict. Increases in population, urbanization, and the value of land could also facili-
tate trade and other interactions that could themselves result in conflict (Acemoglu, Fer-
gusson and Johnson, 2020; Brückner, 2010; Desmet, Ortuño-Ort́ın and Wacziarg, 2012).
These effects might be greatest where inter-group and intra-group diversity reduce so-
cial cohesion and can form the basis for coalitions that contest power and economic
gains (Arbatlı et al., 2020; Esteban, Mayoral and Ray, 2012a,b).
Consistent with a rapacity-based interpretation, many of the battles in Jaques (2007)
after 1700, once there had been time for New World crops to diffuse, are attempts at ter-
ritorial conquests in areas that had increased in caloric potential. Zaman Shah Durrani,
ruler of the Afghan Durrani empire, made several incursions into the Punjab during the
1790s (Singh, 2008). He fought battles in locations such as Gujrat and Amritsar, which
fall into grid cells in the top 3% of all cells in our data for white potato suitability, 4%
for sweet potato suitability, and the top 2% for maize suitability. The Second Anglo-Sikh
War of 1848-49, by which the British East India Company annexed the Punjab, occurred
in many of the same locations (Lawrence, 1997). In China, several battles of the Taiping
Rebellion of 1851-1864 took place in locations such as Zhenjiang, Nanjing, Yuhuatai,
and Changzhou, which are in the top 1% of cells for maize suitability in the data. Led by
Hong Xiuquan, the Taipings were able to establish control over much of southern China,
commanding territory with a population of almost 30 million (Kuhn, 1978).
5.2. Heterogeneity. We begin our investigation of the mechanisms driving our result
by examining its heterogeneity.
To start, recall that we replaced the caloric suitability index with a measure of the
suitability for a given New World crop in Table 4. That we find a conflict-promoting
impact for sweet potatoes implies that there is a mechanism that offsets the effects of
drought resistance that lessened the link between drought and peasant revolts in China
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(Jia, 2014). While the ability to leave cassava in the ground unharvested for long pe-
riods (Hillocks, Thresh and Bellotti, 2002) may facilitate conflict, this too cannot be a
complete explanation, since several other crops also display positive and significant co-
efficients.
In Table 5, we look at different conflict types. That is, instead of counting all con-
flict starts together, we use as dependent variables events such as land battles, sieges,
stormings, or sackings or razings. Across a wide set of conflict types, increasing caloric
suitability due to the Columbian Exchange drives significantly greater violence. Our re-
sults are not, then, driven by any one type of conflict.
We use Table 6 to divide our sample according to UN sub-regions: Central Asia, East-
ern Asia, Southeastern Asia, Southern Asia, and Western Asia. Here, the results are infor-
mative. While there is some limited evidence that the effect we find exists in Eastern and
Western Asia, depending on the specification, the table makes it clear that our results
are driven primarily by South Asia. That is, the mechanisms that drive our result are
those that operate in a densely-settled environment with considerable population het-
erogeneity and several small competing states on the eve of the Columbian Exchange
(de la Garza, 2016; Gommans, 2003; Roy, 1994).9
To explore these features further, we examine whether the impact of caloric suitability
is greater in regions of greater population diversity. We employ two measures of diversity
– ethnic and genetic. The literature has taken these as measures of inter-group and
intra-group diversity, respectively. This analysis should be read as speculative, since
we are unable to measure heterogeneity in the past, and contemporary measures of
diversity may be outcomes of both the Columbian Exchange and of historic conflicts. In
the case of genetic diversity, our data are based on a small number of underlying data
points.
In Table 7, we investigate whether more genetically diverse grid cells respond more
to the Columbian Exchange. We begin by using data from Arbatlı et al. (2020) to iden-
tify the heterozygosity of 207 ethnic groups around the globe, as well as the coordinates
of their centroid. To impute genetic diversity across the cells in our sample, we take
a weighted average of the cells with non-missing heterozygosity data, where weights
decay quadratically with distance from the grid cell in question. Although this involves
substantial spatial imputation, the result is a pattern by which imputed diversity is largely
a function of migratory distance from Addis Ababa (Ashraf and Galor, 2013). By this
measure, the response to caloric suitability is greater in more genetically diverse cells.
9Historically a tributary international order helped promote stability in Eastern Asia (Kang, 2020). This
order may have mitigated the impact of the introduction of New World crops on conflict in this sub-
region.
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FIGURE 9. A simple model of mediation
CSI M Conflict
Following Michalopoulos (2012), we measure ethnic diversity as the log of the number
of ethnic groups recorded within a grid cell in the Ethnologue map of languages. In Table
8, we show that grid cells with a larger number of ethnic groups – i.e. more diverse cells
– experience a greater conflict response to the caloric suitability increases due to the
Columbian Exchange.
Taking stock: our results are driven by several types of New World crop and types of
conflict, but operate primarily in South Asia, and in regions of greater genetic and ethnic
diversity.
5.3. Mediation. Next, we consider possible mediators. Consider a simple model of me-
diation, as represented by the directed acyclic graph in Figure 9. Here, caloric suitability
(CSI) affects the final outcome (Conflict) through an intermediate variable (M). In this
sub-section, we provide evidence for three intermediate mediators – population den-
sity, urbanization, and the spread of the British Empire. We also discuss a number of
other possible mediators for which we do not find evidence of their importance, namely
accumulated state history and inequality within or across grid cells.
We begin by considering urbanization and population density. Our data on urbaniza-
tion are taken from Reba, Reitsma and Seto (2016), while our data on population density
are taken from Klein Goldewijk et al. (2011). In Table 9, we perform three exercises. First,
in the top panel, we estimate Equation (1), but replacing the dependent variable with
one of the two candidate mediator variables, M . Second, in the bottom panel, we es-
timate Equation (1), including them as additional control variables. Third, we use the
mediation analysis proposed by Imai, Keele and Yamamoto (2010) in order to assess the
percentage of the impact of caloric suitability that is mediated by each of these two vari-
ables.10 Note that this final step should be interpreted as suggestive only: all mediation
analyses are premised on the sequential ignorability assumption that the mediator is
assumed to be ignorable (i.e. uncorrelated with omitted determinants of the outcome)
conditional on both observed controls and the exogenous treatment (in our case caloric
suitability).
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 show that the increase in caloric suitability raised the
urban population of the affected cells. Columns (3) and (4) show a similar effect on
10In particular, we use the implementation made available by Hicks and Tingley (2011).
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population density; the Columbian Exchange raised both total population and the ur-
ban population in a grid cell. To put the magnitudes in context, the log of (one plus)
the urban population has a mean of 1.27 and a standard deviation of 3.45, while the log
of population density has a mean of 1.39 and a standard deviation of 1.32. The mean
change in caloric suitability due to the Columbian Exchange, then, increased urban
population by (1.11 × 0.048/1.27) roughly 4.2% of its mean and population density by
(1.11× 0.066/1.39) roughly 5.2% of its mean.
In the bottom panel, it is clear that both of these variables correlate positively with
conflict, conditional on cell and century fixed effects. The coefficient magnitudes im-
ply that a one standard deviation increase in urban population predicts an increase in
conflict starts by (3.45 × 0.181/0.36) roughly 1.7 standard deviations. Similarly, a one
standard deviation increase in population density predicts an increase in conflict starts
by (1.32× 0.091/0.36) roughly 0.33 standard deviations.
It is also clear that controlling for these mediating variables substantially reduces the
estimated coefficient on caloric suitability, relative to Table 2. Results of the Imai, Keele
and Yamamoto (2010) mediation tests suggest that population density explains between
12% and 21% of the impact of the Columbian Exchange on conflict in Asia, while the
increase in urbanization explains between 18% and 24% of it. Note that population
and urbanization both have explanatory power, but only partially explain the impact
of caloric suitability; we take this as evidence that our results are not simply due to a
mechanical relationship between population and conflict prevalence.
Next, we consider the spread of the British Empire, the largest of Europe’s overseas
empires. In Tables 10 and 11, we consider two alternative measures of British colonial
occupation. The first is at the (anachronistic) country level, and is based on the dates
given by Olsson (2009) for the start of colonial rule. We code a cell as part of the British
Empire if it falls within a modern-day country that was occupied by Britain during a
given century. The second is at the grid cell level, and is based on data provided by
the GeaCron Project.11 We use political maps every 50 years from 1500 onwards, and
code a grid cell as part of the British Empire in a given century if it intersects a polygon
corresponding to the British Empire at either the start of the century or in the middle of
the century.
Both the country-level results in Table 10 and the cell-level results in Table 11 tell a
similar story: cells that saw caloric suitability increase after 1500 due to the Columbian
Exchange were significantly more likely to be violently occupied by Britain. Adding the
British Empire as a control variable on the right hand side shows that British coloniza-
tion significanly predicts both conflict starts and civil conflict. However, the decline in
11http://geacron.com/home-en/
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the coefficient on caloric suitability is smaller than in Table 9: while British expansion is
a possible mediator, its quantitative importance is less than that of either urbanization
or population density.
Table A23 considers the spread of other European overseas empires in Asia: those of
France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. The top panel indicates that the Nether-
lands and Spain were significantly less likely to violently occupy cells that saw caloric
suitability increase after 1500 due to the Columbian Exchange, while Portugal was sig-
nificantly more likely. The bottom panel indicates that colonization by Spain signifi-
cantly predicts conflict starts.
5.4. Other potential mechanisms. We also consider a number of possible mechanisms
that, on the basis of our results, we do not believe are important in driving the effect that
we find.
One alternative mechanism is the moderation of weather shocks, which Iyigun, Nunn
and Qian (2017a) find to be important in understanding how the white potato reduced
violence in early modern Europe. We use data on reconstructed temperature anomalies
from Mann et al. (2009). These are deviations from normal temperatures for a given
grid cell, and so in our fixed effects framework they can be interpreted as equivalent to
temperature when they are included as a right hand side variable. These are reported
on a 5◦ × 5◦ grid at an annual frequency. For each grid cell in our data, we use inverse
distance weighting to assign each cell a weighted average of the temperature anomalies
of points within 1000km. We then average over all years in a century to construct the
temperature anomaly for that cell in a given century.
In Table 12, we present estimates of Equation (1), except that we now include two
additional controls: the temperature anomaly and its interaction with caloric suitability.
Across columns, our results suggest that warmer years were less likely to experience
conflict. The coefficient on the interaction is positive, however, suggesting that greater
caloric suitability helped attenuate the link between these weather events and conflict.
Thus we find that the Columbian Exchange dampened the link between weather shocks
and violence in Asia, much like Iyigun, Nunn and Qian (2017a) find in Europe. This
cannot, then, explain why the direct impact of the increase in caloric suitability was an
increase in violence.
We discuss additional candidate mechanisms in the appendix. One broad alternative
category of mechanisms we consider is state-making. Greater agricultural output could
facilitate greater tax revenues, which are then used to finance war (Gennaioli and Voth,
2015; Voigtländer and Voth, 2013). This could be particularly pronounced in the case
of cereals and grains, due to the fact they can be stored and so are easily appropriable
(Mayshar et al., 2015; Scott, 2009). Crops that increase the transparency of production
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are also well-suited to taxation (Mayshar, Moav and Neeman, 2017). The logic here is
also similar to that in Lagerlöf (2010); in a Malthusian environment where agricultural
production is important, states have an incentive to capture productive territory, not
only because it adds to output, but because it can be taxed in order to increase military
capacity.
As shown in Table 4, that maize increases conflict is consistent with the Mayshar et al.
(2015) mechanism of increased taxability. However, the positive and significant coef-
ficients on several tuber and vegetable crops implies that greater ease of extraction by
the state cannot be a complete explanation. Nor do we find evidence that accumulated
state history is a mechanism explaining our result. In order to assign a measure of state
presence to each grid cell in each century, we use the state history index from Borcan,
Olsson and Putterman (2018) for each 50-year period. We assign each cell the sum of
the state history indices at the start and middle of each century for the (anachronistic)
modern country that contains it. In Table A24, we find no evidence that caloric suitabil-
ity increased state presence, nor that the state history index correlates with conflict.
That the introduction of New World crops after 1500 provided individuals with a wider
variety of foodstuffs on which to subsist may have made it less likely that state-making
would take place. Scott (2009) argues that several New World crops were “escape crops.”
Take cassava, which grows underground, does not require much cultivation, and re-
mains edible for up to two years after ripening. Since cooperation was less urgent among
growers of tubers than among growers of cereals and grains, there may have been less
demand for state structures. Furthermore, since tubers required less care, individuals
may have had more time to spend on anti-state activity. Areas that experienced rises
in potential land productivity due to the Columbian Exchange may have thus become
more attractive to non-state actors who battled against Asian and non-Asian states, in-
creasing the incidence of conflict.
We also consider two measures of inequality as possible mediators. The first is within-
cell inequality, as measured by a Gini index of the caloric suitability of all raster cells
within a 1◦ × 1◦ grid cell. The second is cross-cell inequality, as measured by taking
the ratio of a cell’s caloric suitability to the average of its eight neighbors. In Table A25,
we show that cells that gained due to the Columbian Exchange saw their within-cell in-
equality fall, rather than rise, and that this within-cell inequality does not predict con-
flict, conditional on average caloric suitability. In Table A26, we show that cells that saw
their caloric suitability rise due to the Columbian Exchange also saw an increase relative
to their neighbors. This cross-cell inequality does not, however, predict conflict.
Similarly, we also report results in which we include the interaction of the caloric
suitability index and the pre-1500 values of these inequality measures in order to test
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whether the response to the increase in caloric suitability was greater in areas that were
initially more unequal. Results using the Gini index are in Table A25 and those using the
caloric suitability of a cell relative to its neighbors are in Table A26. In both tables the
interaction is insignificant, further suggesting that inequality is unlikely to explain our
findings.
6. CONCLUSION
Using difference in difference and event study frameworks, we have shown that in-
creases in caloric suitability due to the Columbian Exchange increased the prevalence
of conflict in Asia. The standardized effect size that we find is meaningful – roughly half
a standard deviation in standardized magnitude. We interpret our results as evidence
of a rapacity effect. We have provided empirical evidence that population density and
urbanization are quantitatively important mechanisms helping explain the result, sug-
gesting that these cells became more valuable prizes for political actors, including the
British Empire. We find no evidence that moderation of economic shocks, accumulated
state history, or within-cell or cross-cell inequality can explain the results.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean s.d. Min Max N
Conflict Starts 0.039 0.36 0 16 33,120
Civil Conflicts 0.012 0.18 0 11 33,120
Caloric Suitability 4.81 4.12 0 17.1 33,120
Caloric Suitability before 1500 4.32 3.59 0 11.9 33,120
Caloric Suitability after 1500 5.42 4.62 0 17.1 33,120
Change in Caloric Suitability 1.11 1.92 0 9.39 33,120
Century 1,400 258 1,000 1,800 33,120
Latitude 30.0 15.3 -11 55 33,120
Longitude 87.4 28.3 26 146 33,120
Ruggedness 140,792 153,154 76.1 1.03e+06 33,120
Altitude 927 1,186 -27.8 5,457 33,120
Coast Distance 553,772 623,802 0 2.40e+06 33,120
River 0.37 0.48 0 1 33,120
Table 1. Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.019*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001 -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Table 2. Main Results
Civil Conflict StartsConflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Controls X Post Yes Yes Yes Yes
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Table 3. Results with Geographic Controls
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. Controls are latitude, longitude, ruggedness, altitude, coast distance, and river.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
White Potato X Post -0.001 -0.021** 0.003 -0.001
(0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
Tomato X Post 0.169*** 0.175*** 0.062*** 0.088***
(0.025) (0.050) (0.014) (0.026)
Sweet Potato X Post 0.043*** 0.055*** 0.017*** 0.025***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005)
Sunflower X Post 0.006*** 0.002 0.004*** 0.003***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Maize X Post 0.011*** 0.023*** 0.004*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Groundnut X Post 0.043*** 0.054*** 0.017*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003)
Coconut X Post -0.003 -0.011*** -0.002** -0.005***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Cassava X Post 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
Beans X Post 0.039*** 0.052*** 0.016*** 0.024***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post Yes Yes Yes Yes
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Table 4. Results by Crop
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.001* 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.002** 0.000*
(0.001) (0.000)
Caloric Suitability 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.000)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Caloric Suitability 0.001** 0.001* 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 




(1) (2) (3) (4)
     Central  Asia
Caloric Suitability -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.001)
Observations 4,554 4,554 4,554 4,554
     Eastern  Asia
Caloric Suitability 0.010*** 0.004 0.004* 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.004** 0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
Observations 12,015 12,015 12,015 12,015
    South- Eastern  Asia
Caloric Suitability -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.011*** 0.002**
(0.004) (0.001)
Observations 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940
     Southern  Asia
Caloric Suitability 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.035*** 0.039***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.002 -0.008***
(0.005) (0.002)
Observations 6,120 6,120 6,120 6,120
     Western  Asia
Caloric Suitability 0.027 0.051* -0.004** -0.007
(0.021) (0.030) (0.002) (0.005)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.007 0.001
(0.005) (0.001)
Observations 4,491 4,491 4,491 4,491
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conflict Starts
Table 6. Results by Region
Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.004*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Caloric Suitability X Genetic Diversity 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Table 7. Heterogeneity by Genetic Diversity
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.019*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001 -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Caloric Suitability X Ethnic Diversity 0.007** 0.007** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 31,905 31,905 31,905 31,905
Table 8. Heterogeneity by Ethnic Diversity
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.066*** 0.037***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.008*** 0.045***
(0.001) (0.001)
Caloric Suitability 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.013*** 0.015***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.007*** -0.004***
(0.002) (0.001)
ln (1 + Urban Population) 0.181*** 0.179*** 0.074*** 0.073***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.020) (0.020)
ln (1 + Population Density) 0.091*** 0.118*** 0.030*** 0.046***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.010) (0.011)
Mediation: Urban Population 23.58% 21.06% 20.61% 17.69%
Mediation: Population Density 21.41% 14.33% 16.49% 11.72%
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Table 9. Mediation
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
ln (1 + Urban Population) ln (1 + Population Density)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.031*** 0.031***
(0.002) (0.002)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.000
(0.001)
Caloric Suitability 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.016*** 0.017***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001 -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Empire: Britain 0.268*** 0.268*** 0.092*** 0.092***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.018) (0.018)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by
grid cell. 
Table 10. Mediation: The British Empire (Country Level)
Empire: Britain
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.019*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.001)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001*
(0.000)
Caloric Suitability 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.015*** 0.017***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.000 -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Empire: Britain 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.175*** 0.175***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.041) (0.041)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by
grid cell. 
Table 11. Mediation: The British Empire (Grid Cell Level)
Empire: Britain
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Temperature Anomaly X CSI 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.008***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Temperature Anomaly -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.067*** -0.066***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012)
Caloric Suitability 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.021*** 0.022***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.000 -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Table 12. Moderating Temperature Shocks
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.019*** 0.020***
     500km cutoff (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
     1000km cutoff (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008)
     1500km cutoff (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
     2000km cutoff (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post Yes Yes Yes Yes
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Table A1. Conley Standard Errors (500 Km Cutoff)
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Spatial standard errors in parentheses. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.247*** 0.247*** 0.297*** 0.298***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.059) (0.064)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.019 -0.145
(0.042) (0.090)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations used 3,933 3,933 1,683 1,683
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Table A2. Results using Poisson  with high-dimensional fixed effects
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.000 -0.001***
(0.001) (0.000)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Table A3. Outcome variables transformed as ln(1+x)
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.019*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001 -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29,440 29,440 29,440 29,440
Table A4. Results with a lagged dependent variable
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
     Trends for 5 X 5 Cells
Caloric Suitability 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
     Trends for 4 X 4 Cells
Caloric Suitability 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
     Trends for 3 X 3 Cells
Caloric Suitability 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
     Trends for 2 X 2 Cells
Caloric Suitability 0.010** 0.008** -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.000)
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A5. Linear Cell Trends
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.015*** 0.018***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.004* -0.003***
(0.002) (0.001)
Observations 33,093 33,093 33,093 33,093
Country X Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A6. Country X Century FE
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.021*** 0.023***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.003 -0.004***
(0.002) (0.001)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,873 18,873 18,873 18,873
Table A7. Restrict sample to cells with a positive change in CSI
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
     Drop lowest quintile
Caloric Suitability 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.019*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001 -0.002***
(0.002) (0.001)
Observations 26,397 26,397 26,397 26,397
     Drop 2 lowest quintiles
Caloric Suitability 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.008*** -0.006***
(0.003) (0.002)
Observations 19,872 19,872 19,872 19,872
     Drop 3 lowest quintiles
Caloric Suitability 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.001 -0.002
(0.007) (0.002)
Observations 13,248 13,248 13,248 13,248
     Drop 4 lowest quintiles
Caloric Suitability -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.005 0.005
(0.013) (0.007)
Observations 6,624 6,624 6,624 6,624
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A8. Drop cells by quantiles of pre-1500 CSI
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.001 0.000
(0.003) (0.001)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,842 13,842 13,842 13,842
Table A9. Drop cells with coast or river
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
     2 X 2 Cells
Caloric Suitability 0.156*** 0.160*** 0.070*** 0.074***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.016) (0.017)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.006 -0.008***
(0.006) (0.003)
Observations 9,459 9,459 9,459 9,459
     3 X 3 Cells
Caloric Suitability 0.322*** 0.327*** 0.145*** 0.154***
(0.071) (0.076) (0.045) (0.049)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.009 -0.015*
(0.014) (0.009)
Observations 4,617 4,617 4,617 4,617
     4 X 4 Cells
Caloric Suitability 0.569*** 0.584*** 0.262*** 0.279***
(0.154) (0.164) (0.098) (0.105)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.024 -0.028*
(0.027) (0.016)
Observations 2,844 2,844 2,844 2,844
     5 X 5 Cells
Caloric Suitability 0.787*** 0.797*** 0.357** 0.377**
(0.232) (0.246) (0.148) (0.157)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.018 -0.037
(0.043) (0.025)
Observations 1,890 1,890 1,890 1,890
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A10. Change Cell Size
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
     50 years
Caloric Suitability 0.002** 0.003** 0.002* 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.000 -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 62,199 62,199 62,199 62,199
     250 years
Caloric Suitability 0.022* 0.020 0.017** 0.017*
(0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
Observations 15,305 15,305 15,305 15,305
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A11. Change Time Period Length
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.001 -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Table A12. Control for conflicts before 1500 X Post
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Table A13. Control for city populations before 1500 X Post
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.019*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001 -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Table A14. Control for trade routes before 1500 X Post
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.020*** 0.021***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Table A15. Control for pastoral suitability
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Table A16. Discard conflicts with non-Asian actors
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.019*** 0.020***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001 -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Table A17. Add conflicts from Clodfelter and Naravane
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.016*** 0.015***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Table A18. Add conflicts from Clodfelter and Naravane + Additional Data from China
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Table A19. Add conflicts from Clodfelter and Naravane + Additional Data from Turkey
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
     Without 1 largest
Caloric Suitability 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.009*** 0.008***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
     Without 3 largest
Caloric Suitability 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
     Without 5 largest
Caloric Suitability 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
     Without 10 largest
Caloric Suitability 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Table A20. Discard conflicts with the most events
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid
cell. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
     Without capitals 500 km apart
Caloric Suitability 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
     Without capitals 1000 km apart
Caloric Suitability 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001 -0.001*
(0.001) (0.000)
     Without capitals 1500 km apart
Caloric Suitability 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001* -0.001*
(0.001) (0.000)
     Without capitals 2000 km apart
Caloric Suitability 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Table A21. Discard conflicts with distant capitals
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid cell. 
Events Rank
Indian Mutiny 103 1
Taiping Rebellion 38 2
Crusader-Muslim Wars 33 3
Japanese Invasion of Korea 24 4
Mughal-Maratha Wars 24 5
Persian-Afghan Wars 24 6
Seven Years War (India) 23 7
Japan's Era of the Warring States 21 8
1st British-Afghan War 20 9
Mughal-Sikh Wars 20 10
2nd Carnatic War 19 11
Conquests of Genghis Khan 19 12
Mughal Conquest of Northern India 19 13
1st Crusade 16 14
2nd British-Maratha War 15 15
Gempei War 15 16
Later Mughal-Maratha Wars 15 17
Persian Wars of Succession 15 18
Philippine-American War 15 19
Sino-Japanese War 15 20
1st British-Maratha War 14 21
3rd British-Maratha War 14 22
Conquests of Tamerlane 14 23
2nd British-Mysore War 13 24
Indian Campaigns of Ahmad Shah 13 25
Mongol Wars of Kubilai Khan 13 26
Philippines War of Independence 13 27
3rd British-Mysore War 12 28
Manchu Conquest of China 12 29
Maratha Territorial Wars 12 30
Turko-Persian Wars 12 31
1st Opium War 11 32
Later Crusader-Muslim Wars 11 33
Mughal Wars of Succession 11 34
Mughal-Uzbek Wars 11 35
Russo-Turkish Wars 11 36
1st British-Burmese War 10 37
2nd British-Afghan War 10 38
Bijapur-Maratha Wars 10 39
British-Gurkha War 10 40
Byzantine-Ottoman Wars 10 41
Russo-Persian Wars 10 42
Mughal-Ahmadnagar Wars 9 43
Sino-French War 9 44
Bengal War 8 45
Crimean War 8 46
Eastern Muslim Dynastic Wars 8 47
French Conquest of Indo-China 8 48
Muslim Conquest of Northern India 8 49
Seljuk Wars of Expansion 8 50
Wars of the Delhi Sultanate 8 51
2nd British-Burmese War 7 52
2nd British-Sikh War 7 53
3rd Crusade 7 54
Burmese Dynastic Wars 7 55
Later Afghan War of Succession 7 56
Table A22. List of Wars by Number of Events
Persian-Uzbek Wars 7 57
Russian Conquest of Central Asia 7 58
Turko-Persian Wars of Nadir Shah 7 59
1st British-Sikh War 6 60
1st Carnatic War 6 61
2nd Opium War 6 62
Afghan Wars of Succession 6 63
Afghan-Sikh Wars 6 64
Burmese-Siamese Wars 6 65
Byzantine-Turkish Wars 6 66
Early Portuguese Colonial Wars in Asia 6 67
Jin-Song Wars 6 68
Maratha Wars of Succession 6 69
Mongol Invasion of the Middle East 6 70
Mughal-Maratha War of Ismail Beg 6 71
Persian-Mughal Wars 6 72
War of the Meiji Restoration 6 73
War of the Mughal Princes 6 74
1st British-Mysore War 5 75
Anglo-Arab Wars 5 76
Dutch Conquest of Bali 5 77
Later Portuguese Colonial Wars in Asia 5 78
Mongol Invasions of India 5 79
Portuguese Colonial Wars in Arabia 5 80
Rise of the Ming Dynasty 5 81
Turko-Persian War 5 82
Vijayanagar-Bahmani Wars 5 83
War of the American Revolution 5 84
1st Turko-Egyptian War 4 85
Anglo-Persian War 4 86
Ashikaga Rebellion 4 87
Chitral Campaign 4 88
Dutch Wars in the East Indies 4 89
Dutch-Portuguese Colonial Wars 4 90
Earlier Nine Years War 4 91
Early Dutch Wars in the East Indies 4 92
Genko War 4 93
Great Frontier Rising 4 94
Later Muslim Conquest of Northern India 4 95
Ming Imperial Wars 4 96
Mongol Conquest of China 4 97
Mughal Conquest of the Deccan Sultanates 4 98
Pathan War 4 99
Portuguese Colonial Wars in Asia 4 100
Punjab Campaigns of Shah Zaman 4 101
Venetian-Turkish Wars 4 102
Wars of the Deccan Sultanates 4 103
2nd Crusade 3 104
2nd Turko-Egyptian War 3 105
4th British-Mysore War 3 106
4th Crusade 3 107
Anglo-Portuguese Colonial Wars 3 108
British Conquest of Sind 3 109
Bulgarian Imperial Wars 3 110
Chinese-Mongol Wars 3 111
Early Mughal-Sikh Wars 3 112
French Revolutionary Wars (Middle East) 3 113
Later Byzantine-Muslim Wars 3 114
Later Indian Dynastic Wars 3 115
Mughal-Hyderabad War 3 116
Persian-Turkoman Wars 3 117
Satsuma Rebellion 3 118
Sino-Vietnamese War 3 119
Turko-Persian War in Anatolia 3 120
Vietnamese Civil War 3 121
Wars of the Great Seljuk Sultanate 3 122
1st British-Kandyan War 2 123
1st Latin-Byzantine Imperial War 2 124
3rd British-Burmese War 2 125
Afghan Civil Wars 2 126
British-Gwalior War 2 127
Burmese Civil Wars 2 128
Burmese Invasions of Siam 2 129
Chinese Conquest of Taiwan 2 130
Ghor-Ghazni Wars 2 131
Later Dutch Wars in the East Indies 2 132
Later Portuguese Colonial Wars in Arabia 2 133
Later Three Years War 2 134
Mamluk-Ottoman Wars 2 135
Maratha Rebellions 2 136
Maratha-Mysore Wars 2 137
Mongol Dynastic Wars 2 138
Mughal Dynastic War 2 139
Mughal-Berad Wars 2 140
Ottoman-Mamluk War 2 141
Ottoman-Turkoman War 2 142
Persian Invasion of India 2 143
Persian-Georgian War 2 144
Portugese Colonial Wars in Asia 2 145
Portuguese-Maratha War 2 146
Rebellion of Prince Shahjahan 2 147
Saudi-Rashidi Wars 2 148
Siamese-Cambodian Wars 2 149
Spanish-American War 2 150
Thai-Malacca War 2 151
Turko-Persian War in Azerbaijan 2 152
Venetian-Genoese Wars 2 153
Venetian-Turkish War in Cyprus 2 154
Vijayanagar-Gajapati War 2 155
War against Malabar Pirates 2 156
War of the American Revolution: 1775-1783 2 157
Xinjiang Rebellion 2 158
2nd British-Kandyan War 1 159
2nd Latin-Byzantine Imperial War 1 160
3rd British-Kandyan War 1 161
3rd Latin-Byzantine Imperial War 1 162
Anatolian Rebellion 1 163
Baluchi Rebellion 1 164
Branas Rebellion 1 165
British-Bhutanese War 1 166
British-Maratha Wars 1 167
British-Satsuma War 1 168
Burmese-Laotian Wars 1 169
Byzantine Wars of Succession 1 170
Cambodian-Spanish War 1 171
Catherine the Great's 1st Turkish War 1 172
Dutch-Spanish Colonial Wars 1 173
French Revolutionary Wars 1 174
French Revolutionary Wars (Egypt) 1 175
Ghor-Khwarezm War 1 176
Great Java War 1 177
Heiji War 1 178
Hogen War 1 179
Japanese Christian Rising 1 180
Jokyo Disturbance 1 181
Jurchen Invasion of Northern China 1 182
Later Byzantine Military Rebellions 1 183
Malwa-Bahmani Wars 1 184
Mamluk Wars 1 185
Manchu Conquest of Korea 1 186
Martha Civil War 1 187
Mongol Conquest of Asia Minor 1 188
Napoleonic Wars (3rd Coalition) 1 189
Napoleonic Wars (4th Coalition) 1 190
Napoleonic Wars (5th Coalition) 1 191
Ningxia Mutiny 1 192
Ottoman Civil Wars 1 193
Ottoman Conquest of Persia 1 194
Pathan Rising 1 195
Persian Reconquest of Khorasan 1 196
Philippines Expedition 1 197
Revolt of the Three Feudatories 1 198
Rohilla War 1 199
Russian Conquest of the Caucasus 1 200
Russian Invasion of the Caspian 1 201
Russo-Afghan War 1 202
Saga Rebellion 1 203
Serbian Imperial Wars 1 204
Seven Years War (Philippines) 1 205
Shimabara Rebellion 1 206
Shimonoseki War 1 207
Siamese-Laotian Wars 1 208
Thai Invasion of Cambodia 1 209
Turkish-Druse War 1 210
Turko-Persian Gulf War 1 211
Turko-Wahhabi War 1 212
Vellore Mutiny 1 213
Vietnamese-Cham War 1 214
War of the Japanese Emperors 1 215
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Caloric Suitability 0.020*** 0.000 -0.009*** 0.003*** -0.007*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001* 0.000 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Caloric Suitability 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.040***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Empire 0.228*** 5.080 0.015 0.021 0.171* 0.179***
(0.057) (3.211) (0.025) (0.056) (0.089) (0.037)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Empire British French Dutch Portuguese Spanish Any
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
Conflict Starts
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by grid cell. 
Empire
Table A23. Other Empires (Grid Cell Level)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability -0.474*** -0.037
(0.101) (0.126)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.702***
(0.095)
Caloric Suitability 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.019*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.000 -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
State History Index -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by
grid cell. 
Table A24. Other Possible Mediators: State Capacity
State History Index
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability -0.064*** -0.149***
(0.023) (0.022)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post 0.132***
(0.019)
Caloric Suitability 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.019*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001 -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Gini Index 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Caloric Suitability 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.020*** 0.021***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
CSI X Pre-1500 CSI Gini -0.062 -0.064 -0.035 -0.040
(0.081) (0.081) (0.046) (0.047)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001 -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,120 33,120 33,120 33,120
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by
grid cell. 
Table A25. Other Possible Mediators: Within-Cell Inequality
Gini Index
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Caloric Suitability 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.003*
(0.001)
Observations 28,641 28,641 28,641 28,641
Caloric Suitability 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.019*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001 -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Relative CSI -0.020 -0.021 -0.015 -0.016
(0.016) (0.016) (0.010) (0.011)
Observations 28,641 28,641 28,641 28,641
Caloric Suitability 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.024** 0.024**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.010) (0.010)
CSI X Pre-1500 Relative CSI -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004
(0.016) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009)
Pre-1500 Suitability X Post -0.001 -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 28,629 28,629 28,629 28,629
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by
grid cell. 
Table A26. Other Possible Mediators: Relative CSI
Relative CSI
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
Conflict Starts Civil Conflict Starts
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FIGURE A1. Randomization Inference: Without Spatial Restrictions
FIGURE A2. Randomization Inference: With Spatial Restrictions
